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The Formalist Picture of Cognition




Abstract. This paper represents a philosophical experiment inspired by the formalist philosophy of 
mathematics. 
In the formalist picture of cognition, the principal act of knowledge generation is represented as 
tentative postulation – as introduction of a new knowledge construct followed by exploration of the 
consequences  that  can be  derived from it.  Depending on the result,  the  new construct  may be 
accepted as normative, rejected, modified etc. Languages and means of reasoning are generated and 
selected in a similar process.
In  the  formalist  picture,  all  kinds  of  “truth”  are  detected  intra-theoretically.  Some  knowledge 
construct may be considered as “true”, if it is accepted in a particular normative knowledge system. 
Some knowledge construct may be considered as persistently true, if it remains invariant during the 
evolution  of  some knowledge system for  a  sufficiently long time.  And,  if  you  wish,  you may 
consider some knowledge construct as absolutely true, if you do not intend abandoning it in your 
knowledge system.
And finally, in the formalist picture, all kinds of ontologies generated by humans can be demystified 
by reconstructing them within the basic solipsist ontology simply as hypothetical branches of it. 
Key words: truth, persistent truth, absolute truth, formalism, pragmatism, constructivism, 
solipsism, knowledge construct, tentative postulation, ontology, coherence, wrong knowledge, 
cognition.
1. Introduction
This  paper  represents  a  philosophical  experiment  inspired  by  the  formalist  philosophy  of 
mathematics and by the pluralism of formal languages and ontologies modeled and meta-modeled 
by  computer  scientists.  From the  formalist  point  of  view,  any knowlegde  system can  be  best 
understood as a more or less definite “engine of reasoning” governed by the language “syntax”, a 
set of assumptions and means of reasoning. And, from the computer science point of view, any 
vocabulary, taxonomy, conceptual model etc. may be considered, in a sense, as an ontology.
From these  points  of  view,  solipsism represents  an  ontology  that  is  based  on  a  minimum of 
metaphysical assumptions. Thus, solipsism represents, in a sense, the most fundamental ontology. If 
so, couldn't all the other kinds of ontology be reconstructed within solipsism simply as hypothetical 
branches of it?    
The idea of some ontologies being more fundamental than other ones is not completely new. For 
example, Riegler (2005: 62) concludes: “Therefore, the EE perspective is a subset of RC.” (EE 
stands for evolutionary epistemology, RC – for radical constructivism) Similarly: “Thus realism 
becomes a special case of constructivism, which tries to absolutize its own construction of reality by 
setting it equal with an independent reality.” (Mitterer 2008: 160).
However, Russell (2004: 729) argued for the opposite thesis: “James' doctrine is an attempt to build 
a superstructure of belief upon a foundation of skepticism, and like all such attempts it is dependent 
on fallacies.”
But let's try once more, nevertheless...
2. “Wrong” Knowledge and Knowledge Constructs 
According to Plato's famous and still fascinating formulation, knowledge is “justified true belief”. 
But, as I'm trying to argue in (Podnieks, 2009b: 5), it's not a good idea, 2300 years after Plato, to 
start  philosophy of cognition from such a complicated notion as “justified true belief”.  Mainly, 
people don't  know in advance (sometimes – for centuries), which parts of a particular piece of 
knowledge are, in fact, “true”, and which aren't. Hence, the somewhat paradoxical term – “wrong 
knowledge”. For any philosophy of cognition, "wrong" knowledge should be as prominent a subject 
as "true" knowledge. Therefore, when speaking about knowledge, I mean also such “overthrown” 
(but  nonetheless,  prominent)  pieces  of  it  as,  for  example,  Aristotelian  mechanics  or  Ptolemy’s 
theory of epicycles.
The widely spread obsession with “truth” and the rejection of solipsism, pragmatism, formalism and 
constructivism is caused, I think, by a poor understanding of the knowledge structure. Many people 
understand knowledge as an unordered, unconnected heap of separate propositions and beliefs that 
possess separate “meanings” and that are believed to be “true” or “ false” separately. But even our 
everyday knowledge includes  structures – propositions are related via (imperfect!) reasoning – to 
say the least. Much more important units of knowledge are not reducible to sets of propositions: 
“adequate”  and  “wrong”  models,  “successful”  and “overthrown”  theories,  ontologies,  methods, 
means of reasoning, paradigms, languages, etc. 
To capture the situation in an adequate way, a more general notion is needed covering all the above-
mentioned  ones.  I  would  propose  “knowledge  construct”  as  a  general  term  for  all  kinds  of 
knowledge elements, structures, methods, means of reasoning, languages,  hypotheses etc.  For a 
similar purpose, Glasersfeld (2001:31) is using the term “conceptual construct”. 
The body of human knowledge generated during thousands of years does not represent an arbitrary 
heap  of  unordered,  unconnected  fragments.  There  are  remarkable  signs  of  order,  connection, 
inference, evolution, convergence and success in it. Some of the knowledge constructs were used 
only temporary: celestial spheres, Aristotelian mechanics, Ptolemy’s epicycles, phlogiston, caloric, 
aether, etc. But some other (perfect and less perfect, stable and evolving) constructs are still used in 
many  of  the  successful  parts  of  knowledge:  heliocentric  planetary  systems,  stars,  galaxies, 
molecules,  atoms,  photons,  cells,  DNA,  neurons,  etc.  Should  we  ignore  large  parts  of  our 
intellectual heritage, or should we try understanding all of them – to improve the cognition process?
3. The Formalist Philosophy of Mathematics
Let's consider the prototype of the proposed philosophical experiment – constructing and exploring 
of axiom systems in mathematics.
Some people think that formalist philosophy of mathematics was discarded as “ridiculous” many 
years  ago.  However,  this  was  “achieved”  by  replacing  a  real  philosophy  by  its  caricature  – 
“formalism  representing  mathematics  as  a  meaningless  game  with  symbols”.  Of  course,  this 
caricature was provoked by an extremely naive idea that the opponents of formalism are obsessed 
with – by the idea of each word possessing a separate independent “meaning”. By using a similar  
“method” one could easily reduce to the most naive Platonism even the most “subtle” versions of 
“mathematical realism”. 
According to the (real) formalist philosophy of mathematics, in principle,  one may postulate any  
axioms that make sense (whatever it means), and explore the consequences that can be derived from 
these  axioms  (by applying  of  some accepted  explicit  means  of  reasoning,  i.e.  of  some logic). 
Sometimes, the exploration takes many years. Of course, the axioms can't be justified (“proved”) in 
the  mystical  absolute  sense  many  people  are  awaiting.  But,  nevertheless,  during  the  years  of 
exploration, the axioms may be (and are!) treated by mathematicians not as mere hypotheses, but as 
“7x24 true” statements,  i.e.  not  as attempted descriptions of some external “world”,  but as the 
“world”  itself.  In  mathematics,  such a  “devoted”  way of  exploration  (“believing  axioms”)  has 
shown as very efficient (Podnieks, 1992: Chapter 1).
For humans, a “devoted” (in fact, Platonist) thinking is the best way of working with imagined 
(postulated etc.) structures. As put by Hersh (1979: 32): “... the typical working mathematician is a 
Platonist on weekdays and a formalist on Sundays.” My interpretation: I'm Platonist on working 
days - when I'm doing mathematics (otherwise, my "doing" will be inefficient), and I'm Formalist  
on weekends -  when I'm thinking "about" mathematics (otherwise, I will  end up in mysticism). 
Thus, as a technical tip, Platonist thinking is extremely useful.
According  to  the  formalist  interpretation  of  Gödel's  incompleteness  theorem (Podnieks,  1992: 
Chapter 6), if the axiom system is universal enough, then its exploration leads inevitably either to 
contradictions  or  to  unsolvable  problems.  Assume,  this  moment  has  arrived.  Should  additional 
axioms  be  introduced  to  enable  solving  of  the  otherwise  unsolvable  problems?  Or,  to  avoid 
contradictions, some of the axioms should be dropped, modified or replaced? Which ones? Should 
we, in order to avoid the contradictions, first, try dropping the hypotheses that were adopted as 
axioms  later than the other ones? Or,  in fact,  contradictions are caused by some of the earlier 
axioms that, for many years, are believed to be “more fundamental”? Or even, contradictions are 
caused by the accepted means of reasoning?
4. Tentative Postulation and the Formalist Picture of Cognition
Let's try applying of the above formalist model of mathematics to the whole of cognition.
In  this  way,  we  will  obtain  the  formalist  picture  of  cognition,  in  which  cognition  consists  of 
generating and adopting assumptions and exploring of their consequences. Namely, in the formalist 
picture,  the  main  act  of  knowledge  generation  is  represented  as  tentative  postulation –  as 
introduction of a new knowledge construct followed by exploration of the consequences that can be 
derived from it (by applying of some accepted means of reasoning).  Depending on the result, the 
new construct  may be accepted as  normative,  rejected,  modified  etc.  Languages  and means of 
reasoning themselves are generated and selected, of course, in a similar process.
Thus, if some knowledge construct appears to be successful (or, at least, worth of consideration), 
one can try accepting it as normative and explore the consequences. Of course, usually (but not 
always entirely), such a newly adopted construct must fit somehow into the system of constructs 
already accepted. During the period of exploration, from the point of view of the involved group of 
“devoted” researchers,  the new construct  may be considered as “true”,  i.e.  not as an attempted 
description  of  some  external  “world”,  but  as  the  “world”  itself.  If  you  wish  –  as  “direct  
representation of reality (ADR)” – the term used by Weisberg (2007). 
But  if  the  accepted  (or  attempted)  system  of  knowledge  constructs  (knowledge  system)  starts 
causing problems (incompleteness, anomalies etc.), then it may be impossible to retain it as it is. 
Should additional constructs be introduced to overcome incompleteness? Or, to manage anomalies, 
some of the accepted constructs should be dropped, modified or replaced? Which ones? The latest 
ones?  Or,  in  fact,  the  problems  are  caused  by  the  constructs  that  are  believed  to  be  “more 
fundamental” and are counted already as “background knowledge”? Or, even, the problem is caused 
by the accepted means of reasoning or other “first principles” so beloved? Or, by the language used 
to express them? Thus, a kind of Kuhnian scientific revolution may be necessary...
Of course, the idea of knowledge being generated by means of tentative postulation isn't completely 
new. It can be traced back to Berkeley, Hume, Kant, Mach and Einstein – to mention only the most 
prominent  names.  Pragmatism and  constructivism are  based  on  similar  ideas.  The  difference? 
Formalism rejects implicit knowledge constructs completely. 
Sometimes,  people are  fighting each other  by means of “thought  experiments”,  by referring to 
“unavoidable intuitions” etc. From the formalist point of view, any kind of such arguments is, in 
fact,  an  application  of  some  background  knowledge that  is  not  formulated  explicitly.  Any 
background knowledge is, in fact, some implicit ontology or theory that is considered to be more 
fundamental than the ideas to be justified or refuted. Formalists would advice to invest more effort  
in formulating the background knowledge explicitly.
5. Building the Traditional Scientific Ontology within Solipsism
Consider the “the body of human knowledge generated during thousands of years”, about which I 
can  read  in  books,  papers,  on  the  internet  etc.  Is  it  a  product  of  my mind  only?  Or,  it  is  a 
mystification (“simulated reality”) created by some superior civilization playing with me? Or, it was 
generated  by people  very  much  like  me?  Of  course,  nobody will  ever  be  able  to  decide  this 
trilemma in the mystical absolute sense many people are awaiting. But, nevertheless, until now, the 
third alternative –  “human race with me as part of it” – has been much more successful than the 
first  two  ones.  Isn't  it  an  efficient  way  of  bringing  the  best  possible  order  into  my  personal 
perceptions?  Hence, it makes sense to create, within my basic solipsism, a specific hypothetical 
ontology, in which the knowledge construct “human race with me as part of it” is introduced as 
normative. The users of this hypothetical ontology are considering the existence of “human race 
with  me  as  part  of  it”  as  an  absolutely  true  “fact”,  as  the  “world”  itself.  But,  exploration  of 
alternatives remains allowed, of course...
Similarly “unprovable”, but extremely successful has shown the reality construct –  “Universe with 
human race as a temporary part of it”. Isn't it an efficient way of bringing even more order into the 
perceptions of mine and my human fellows? So, let's add this construct as normative to the above-
mentioned hypothetical  ontology.  The users  of  this  ontology will  consider  the existence  of  the 
“Universe with human race as a temporary part of it” as an absolutely true “fact”, as the “world” 
itself.  Let's call  this ontology the  traditional scientific ontology.  But, exploration of alternatives 
remains allowed, of course...  
Isn't  this  approach a  kind  of  “hypothetical  realism” rejected  by radical  constructivists  (Riegler, 
2005: 60)? 
I agree that the naive idea of “human knowledge approaching reality” should be applied with care. 
There are no purely extra-theoretical ways of “measuring the distance” between some theory T and 
reality. To test predictions of models generated by T, we need, at least, some background theory 
governing our experiments.
For  example,  to  “measure  the  accuracy”  of  Newtonian  mechanics,  plain  everyday background 
knowledge will not help. Instead, we must use some theory allowing observation of objects moving 
at speeds comparable to speed of light. Or, some theory allowing observation of subtle effects like 
as perihelion precession of Mercury.  But the best explanation of the success and limitations of 
Newtonian mechanics is, of course, its successor theory – Einstein's relativity theory.  More on this  
– in Sections 7-9.
6. Building the “Santa Claus Ontology”
For a child, the “Santa Claus hypothesis” represents a simple and natural explanation of various 
happenings around Christmas. Thus, for a child, it makes sense to create a specific hypothetical 
ontology, in which the knowledge construct “Santa Claus” is accepted as normative.
However, as time goes on, belief in the existence of Santa Claus starts causing unsolvable problems 
– “experiential surprises and disappointments” – as put by Hookway (2008). At this moment, people 
change their ontology. The “Santa Claus hypothesis” is replaced by a less romantic explanation. 
Sadly enough, but for a child who dies before that moment, the  “Santa Claus ontology” remains 
undestroyed, and the existence of Santa Claus remains forever an absolutely true “fact”,  as the 
“world” itself.
Thus, aren't the cognitive mechanisms generating the “Santa Claus ontology”, the various religious 
ontologies, the traditional scientific ontology, and all the other kinds of ontologies generated by 
humans, in a sense, identical?
7. Knowledge Systems and Truth
Following this formalistic route, what should happen with the notion of “truth”?
Of course, at the level of the fundamental ontology, as put by Heinz von Foerster: “Truth is the 
invention of a liar”.
But,  if  we  start  building  more  specific  ontologies  and  theories  by  adopting  some  knowledge 
constructs as normative?  Then,  should't  we define truth intra-theoretically –   with respect  to  a  
particular normative knowledge system? As put by Putnam (1979: 236): “... for a strong anti-realist 
truth makes no sense except as an intra-theoretic notion.”
Thus, our definition of “truth” could be as trivial as follows:  some knowledge construct may be  
considered  as  “true”,  if  it  is  accepted  in  a  particular  normative  knowledge  system (i.e.  it  is 
postulated or can be derived by using the means of reasoning accepted in that system). “Normative” 
might mean here normative for me, for a research project, for some group of researchers, for some 
larger community etc.
The idea of defining truth intra-theoretically can be traced back to the so-called coherence theory of  
truth, which “... states that the truth of any (true) proposition consists in its coherence with some 
specified set of propositions” – as put by Young (2008). However, for a formalist, it looks strange 
that  the  selection  of  languages  and  means  of  reasoning  is  left  out  here.  How could  “cohere” 
propositions in an unstructured heap of them? Or, (the so-called “natural”) language and means of 
reasoning are taken for granted and perfect?
8. Evolution of Knowledge and Persistent Truth
Let us return to Putnam (1979: 236) again: “... he [antirealist – K.P.] tends to be skeptical about the 
idea of “convergence” in science – he does not think our theory is a better description of the same 
entities that Archimedes was describing.”
Indeed, we would get into trouble, if we would stop at our trivial intra-theoretical notion of truth, 
and would ignore the  evolution of knowledge and the remarkable signs of convergence in it. But 
shouldn't  we  better  to  continue  following  our  intra-theoretical  route,  and  try  detecting  this  
convergence intra-theoretically?  As time goes  on,  new theories  are  replacing the  old ones,  but 
during this process, don't some of the knowledge constructs remain  invariant? Should we ignore 
this fact, or should we try using it to improve the cognition process?
For example, what kind of “evidence” do have physicists in favor of the “existence” of quarks? 
According  to  the  actual  theory,  quarks  can't  be  observed  even  in  principle.  “For  the  current 
purposes, this construct works fine, but will this situation continue in the future? If not, quarks will 
be removed from the picture like as phlogiston and aether were removed. But what if quarks will be 
retained as a construct in  all  future physical theories? Do physicists need more than this kind of 
invariance to claim the "real existence" of quarks and believe in having a "direct representation" of 
them?” (Podnieks, 2009a: 4)
The  idea  that  a  really  useful  notion  of  truth  can  be  achieved  only by taking  into  account  the 
evolution of knowledge can be traced back to James (1975: 106): something is true, if it is not only 
convenient for the moment, but if it is “expedient in the long run... and on the whole".
Or, as put by Rorty (1982: XXVIII): “... pragmatist refused to accept the Philosophical distinction 
between first  rate  truth-by-correspondence-to-reality and second rate  truth-as-what-is-it-good-to-
believe. ... Pragmatism denies the possibility of getting beyond the Sellarsian notion of “seeing how 
things hang together” – which, for the bookish intellectual of recent times, means seeing how all the 
various vocabularies of all the various epochs and cultures hang together.”
Thus, people of “various epochs and cultures” aren't simply playing with their truths-as-what-is-it-
good-to-believe as an unstructured heap. Since centuries, people are trying to construct “various 
vocabularies”, i.e. (ignoring Russell warning) “superstructures of belief upon a foundation” of their 
truths-as-what-is-it-good-to-believe. And sometimes, they are trying to make the most successful of 
their “vocabularies” normative. 
Thus, we could extend our intra-theoretical definition of truth as follows: some knowledge construct  
may  be  considered  as  persistently  true,  if  it  remains  invariant  during  the  evolution  of  some  
knowledge system for a sufficiently long time.
How long exactly? It may depend... The real thing is the very phenomenon of invariance, and not 
the way how people categorize it – as “truth” or otherwise.   
9. Absolute Truth
As put by Josef Mitterer: “Views are true because and as long as we adopt them.” (see Gadenne, 
2008: 159). Or, by James (1975: 106): “The 'absolutely” true, meaning what no farther experience 
will ever alter, ...”
  
Thus, if you wish, you may consider  some knowledge construct as absolutely true, if you do not  
intend abandoning it in your knowledge system. 
For  example,  let's  ask  the  following  question:  do atoms  exist?  “Atom” is  a  common name of 
knowledge  constructs  appearing  in  various  theories:  “philosophical  atoms”  (Democritus),  ..., 
“chemical atoms” (Dalton), ..., “planetary atoms” (Rutherford), “Bohr atoms”, ..., modern “nuclear 
atoms”, etc. What do have all these model atoms in common? Are there the same “real atoms” 
behind all  these  model  atoms?  One may reasonably believe  it,  but  it  can't  be  “proved” in  the 
mystical  absolute  sense  many people  are  awaiting.  The real  phenomenon we have  here  is  the 
invariance of atom as a knowledge construct in successive theories. If you don't intend abandoning 
atoms in your theory, you may continue believing in their existence as in an absolutely true “fact”,  
as the “world” itself.
10. Thagard and Barrett
To my best knowledge, the idea of detecting scientific truth intra-theoretically and with respect to 
knowledge evolution appears for the first time as the “Deepening Maxim” in the work of Thagard 
(2007: 41): "If a theory not only maximizes explanatory coherence, but also broadens its evidence 
base over time and is deepened by explanations of why the theory’s proposed mechanism works, 
then we can reasonably conclude that the theory is at least approximately true." 
 
And, it seems, independently,  this idea appears as “Descriptive Nesting” in the work of Barrett  
(2008:  213) – as “a notion of local  probable approximate truth in  terms of  descriptive nesting 
relations between current and subsequent theories".
Thus, the best proof of Newtonian mechanics' being approximately true is the explanation of its 
success and limitations provided by the successor theory – Einstein's relativity theory. Of course, 
having a successful successor theory – it's a happy situation available only from time to time.... 
10. Conclusion
For an overview of the main results of our philosophical experiment – see Abstract.
Among the  other  lessons that  could  be learned during the  experiment  the following should  be 
mentioned.
For a formalist, it looks strange that the selection of languages and means of reasoning is left out of 
a serious philosophical analysis. It seems, usually, the so-called “natural” language and means of 
reasoning are taken for granted, good enough and even containing “hidden treasures” that may be 
discovered by means of introspection... In fact, however, languages and means of reasoning are 
generated and selected in the same tentative postulation process as any other knowledge constructs. 
I would advice also to invest more effort in formulating the background knowledge explicitly.
So, let's try discovering as precisely as possible the “axiomatic basis” of each kind of ontology that 
appeared during the history of human knowledge. I.e. let's try building axiomatic models of Plato? 
Aristotle? Galileo? Descartes? Newton? Kant? Laplace? Hegel? Engels? James? Einstein? Carnap? 
Popper? Wittgenstein? Putnam at various stages of his philosophical development? For example, is 
there any definite logic in the means of reasoning used by Wittgenstein in his “Tractatus Logico-
Philosophicus”?
And, first of all, aren't the cognitive mechanisms generating the “Santa Claus ontology”, the various 
religious  ontologies,  the  traditional  scientific  ontology,  and  all  the  other  kinds  of  ontologies 
generated by humans, in a sense, identical? I.e. independently of the size of ambitions, isn't “all  
that” mere tentative postulation?
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